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Abstract: With the recent capability of being applicable in enormous fields, the Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) have
drawn attention of researchers and industries in diverse areas. Being deployed in areas that are hostile, WSN pose lots of
difficulties and challenges to the research fraternity. In this paper, we discuss a generalized security framework for real
world application of WSN. In particular we have considered the scenario of civil engineering field, a road tunnel. The
proposed work mainly focus on security model for self adaptive lighting Model for road tunnel in WSN, and hence called
Smart tunnel which provide the safety of the tunnels.

INTRODUCTION
Considering one of the real world scenario, a road
Tunnel, an underground passageway completely
enclosed except openings for ingress and egress. The
operation of the tunnels is critical as it affects the
safety of the drivers and also it involves the
expenditure of energy for proper lighting. Studies
have revealed some of the worst accidents that
occurred in tunnels due to the lack of proper lighting
and safety measures. Major accidents include
especially from vehicle fires when combustion gases
can asphyxiate users, as happened at the Gotthard
Road Tunnel in Switzerland in 2001. One of the
worst railway disasters ever, the Balvano train
disaster, was caused by a train stalling in the Armi
tunnel in Italy in 1944, killing 426 passengers.

Security is of a paramount importance for the
deployment of WSN applications in a real
environment. Due to the limited computation and
communication capabilities offered by sensors,
introducing security means to further reduce those
resources for the application level. Therefore, the use
of security primitives in WSNs requires to balance
the needs for an adequate level of security while
limiting the impact on resources. However, most of
the security approaches for WSNs presented in
literature are developed as stand-alone mechanisms
that do not take into account the stringent
requirements of realworld applications and
deployments. For instance, TinySec [1] was one of
the first work that addresses the security concern in
WSNs. TinySec provides a fully implemented
architecture for link-layer security in WSNs based on
well-known cryptographic primitives. Another
important aspect of TinySec is that its security
properties exploit the limitations that are intrinsic of
WSNs. For instance, WSNs have limited bandwidth.
Therefore, it becomes possible to relax certain
security properties and still guarantee adequate
protection to specific attacks. Although TinySec
provides a usable approach for WSN applications,
pragmatic aspects that need to be addressed before a
real deployment are left undefined. One of such
aspects is key management.

Hence to avoid such accidents a self-adaptive lighting
model inside the tunnel is required, which should be
secure from attacks that are both physical and logical.
In section 1, we discuss with the deployment of the
sensor nodes in the real world application, a road
tunnel. Section 2, describes the security threats and
the security requirements with respect to the tunnel
application. The proposed generic Security
architecture for a real world application using Self
Adaptive Lighting Model to overcome these threats
to provide security is discussed in section 3.
Summary and conclusions are briefed in section 4.

The authors state that several options are available
but not a single one is integrated with their
architecture. Basically, it is left to the application
developers to implement which key distribution
mechanism is the best match for the characteristics of
their applications. We believe that key distribution is
an important aspect of a security architecture that
constrains the integration with the application level.
Therefore, key management must be concretely
addressed before a seamless integration can be
achieved.

1. Deployment of Sensor in Real world Application
Scenario: Smart Tunnel
WSN is a collection of nodes with sensing
capabilities and they have the ability to self organize.
The deployment of the sensor nodes can be manual so
that can get precise location information also is
flexible and convenient. In this work we have
considered a real world scenario a road tunnel as
shown in figure 1, manual deployment of the sensor
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nodes is best suited, as the sensor nodes are to be
placed along the sides of the inner tunnel.

Figure 2. Proposed Security Architecture, Self Adaptive
Lighting for Smart Tunnel

The different modules of the self-adaptive model are
i: Node Deployment ii: Key Management iii: Data
Aggregation iv: Data Processing. The function of the
Node Deployment module is to manually deploy the
sensor nodes along the inner perimeter of the tunnel.
The second module is the key management module,
the function is to generate and exchange the keys
among the nodes so that the system could be secured
which is discussed in detail in the next section. The
third module of the system design is Data
Aggregation Module which is responsible for the
exchange of the sensed data between the nodes and
the base station. The last module is the data
processing that is received at the Base station and
forwarded to the control room.

Figure 1: Smart Tunnel Scenario

In fact, each application based on WSN sensing
technology has its own specific requirements which
are derived from both the WSN setting specific to the
application itself (nodes hardware, placement, access,
just to mention a few) as well as from the overall
requirements of the application where the information
gathered through the nodes are collected. In this
tunnel scenario the deployed sensors senses the light
in the tunnel and gather the sensed information from
all the nodes and forward it to the Base station, based
on the light inside the tunnel the Base Station tunes
the lighting system through the control room to
reduce the energy consumption hence called as
SELF-ADAPTIVE or SMART TUNNEL.

3.1 Key Management for Smart Tunnels
For existing attacks, many wireless sensor network
key management scheme and authentication methods
have been proposed. Schnauzer L. et al[2] proposed
random key pre- distribution management scheme,
and many scholars put forward a number of programs
and protocols on this basis, such as the q-Composite
Random Key Pre-distribution scheme and symmetric
polynomial
random key
pre-distribution
management scheme. For cluster-type network, some
scholars have proposed a low-power key management
scheme [5], lightweight key management scheme,
key pre-distribution scheme based on cluster and key
pre-distribution scheme based on ECC. Aiming at the
limitations of existing scheme, the paper provides a
key management scheme based on one-way Hash
function and the symmetric key scheme. The analysis
show that the proposed scheme can effectively
weaken the threat of node capture, be resilience
against node replication or node forgery. Besides of
good security properties, the scheme promises good
node addition or network extension ability.

2. Security Threats and Security Requirements
By envisaging the tunnel scenario threats/attacks are
possible, hence protecting the system from such
threats is very important. The threats could be passive
or active. Passive threats include listening to the
communication and traffic analysis whereas, Active
threats include reply attack and node compromise. To
overcome these threats/attacks data integrity,
confidentiality and authentication is required and to
cater to these requirements a key management.
3. Proposed Generic Security Architecture for a
Real World Application using Self Adaptive
Lighting Model
The generic system Architecture for real world
applications in WSN for providing security to road
tunnels is as shown in as shown in the figure 2.
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Security in WSN can be achieved by proper Key
management techniques. In general Key management
has various phases such as i: key generation ii: predeployment iii: registration iv: post –deployment as
discussed below.

2: The data then encrypted with the secret key
possessed by the node
Message2=EsecretKey(data)
Message3= EpubBS(Message2, NodeID)
3: The message3 is then sent to the Base station
4: Base Station on receiving this Message will
perform the decryption to obtain the message2 and
the NodeID

3.2 Key Generation Phase: In this phase the
different keys require are identified, the nodes use
symmetric keys to communicate with the base station.
Base station has pair of keys (public key and the
private key) At first keys are generated using oneway hash functions. One-way hash function takes a
binary string of arbitrary length as input, and outputs
a binary string of fixed length. It is considered to
have the following prerequisite properties: (1)Preimage resistant: Given the output y, it should be hard
to find any x, such that y=Hash(x). (2)Collision
resistant: It should be hard to find any x1 and x2,
such that Hash(x1)=Hash(x2). The base station
selects a random seed value say Xo, the key for can
be obtained by hashing this seed value as Hash(Xo)->
X1 key. Then using this X1 as the nest seed we get
the second key as Hash(X1)-> X2 and so on for N
keys where N is the number of Sensor nodes in the
network. The keys generated by the station are stored
in a key table, each of the key generated is unique and
each node will be assigned a key from this table.

5: The base station then uses the NodeID and
checks the table to obtain the key corresponding to
the node and decrypts to obtain the data . In this
way data is received from the sensors and the value
of the data is aggregated based on the number of
messages received
3.4. Data Processing Phase:
In this module the data obtained by the base station is
given to the control room, where the data is inferred
and based on the inference the lighting of the tunnel
is controlled.
4. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS

Pre-Deployment Phase:
In this phase the node placed with a secret key and
the public key of the base station is deployed
manually around the inner perimeter of the tunnel.
Registration Phase:
Each of the nodes deployed , will register themselves
with the base station by sending an message which
consists of NodeID,SecretKey encrypted using the
Base Station Public key Message1=EpubBS
(NodeID, Secret Key) , the base station receives this
message and decrypts it with its public key to obtain
the identity of the node registering to the network.
The base station forms a table that contains the
nodeID and the Secretkey which will be used for
further communication. All the nodes deployed
register in the same manner with the base station.
POST-DEPLOYMENT PHASE:
Once the keys are deployed and the nodes registered
the data sensing exchange begins.
3.3. Data Aggregation Phase:
The third module of the system design is Data
Aggregation Module which is responsible for the
exchange of the sensed data between the nodes and
the base station. The exchange takes place as follows,

Figure 3: Comparisons of Smart Tunnel with Normal Tunnel

The key management scheme discussed provides
security among the nodes and also between the nodes
and base station. All nodes authenticate by
registration process with the base station. By using
encryption we provide confidentiality. The above
graph shows that the smart tunnel is energy efficient
and also secure.

1: Data is sensed by the sensor(ie the intensity of the
light in the tunnel)
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